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COMMENT
Technology & Textualism: A Case Study on the
Challenges a Rapidly Evolving World Poses
to the Ascendant Theory
MATT ELGIN *
I. INTRODUCTION
We live in a world of rapid technological change. Phones and computers are replaced every few years. Companies work frantically to stay
one step ahead of hackers. Big data has proliferated. Yet the legal industry is notoriously resistant to change. This is understandable. At its core,
this most conservative of professions resists the ever-quickening pace of
innovation. The law is meant to be stable: a bastion of tradition and the
foundation of a properly functioning society. But inevitably, technology
has seeped into every corner of the law, from the sterile, cavernous conference rooms of big law firms to the hallowed halls of judges’ chambers. Some have embraced this change more readily than others.
Over the past twenty years, legal scholars have filled academic and
professional journals with examples of technology’s impact on various
areas of the law.1 Attorneys and judges have been forced to grapple with
the legal implications of the Internet, email, social media, and artificial
intelligence.2 Discovery now involves scouring vast quantities of elec* Law Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 2021-2022; Law Clerk,
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 2020-2021; J.D., The George
Washington University Law School; M.Sc. Imperial College London; B.A., Vassar College. The
author would like to thank Brian Farkas, C.K. Kevin Park, and Professor Michael Abramowicz for
their helpful comments and edits through this process.
1
See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Future Work, 2020 U. Ill. L. Rev. 889 (2020); Jenna Charlotte
Spatz, Scheduled Skyping with Mom or Dad: Communicative Technology’s Impact on California
Family Law, 31 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 143 (2011); Mark S. Kende, Technology’s Future Impact on
State Constitutional Law: The Montana Example, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 273 (2003).
2
See, e.g., United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2010) (considering imposition of
Internet ban as condition of supervised release for sex offender); United States v. Am. Library Ass’n,

97

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2022

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 2

98

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

tronically stored information, often leading to ballooning scope and cost
of discovery in cases.3 Law firms use artificial intelligence and other
programs to help manage litigation, identify issues in contracts, maintain
adequate records, and protect their clients’ sensitive information.4 The
practice of the law has certainly changed, but has legal philosophy—the
underlying principles of the law and how to interpret and apply it—kept
apace? There are worrying signs that it has not.
One area of the law where the rapid advance of technology has been
felt in recent years is civil procedure. In Encompass Insurance Co. v.
Stone Mansion Restaurant Inc., the Third Circuit relied on a technical
reading of the statute and a strict textualist analysis to conclude that the
stratagem known as “snap removal” was permitted under the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).5 This provision codifies the so-called
“forum defendant rule,” providing that “[a] civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of . . . [diversity] jurisdiction . . . may not be
removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”6 The
Third Circuit ruled that under the plain language of the statute, forum
defendants could, in fact, remove to federal court under certain circumstances.7 Using this little-known technique, a defendant sued in a state
court in its home state may circumvent the forum defendant rule and
remove the matter to federal court so long as they file the notice of removal before they are “properly joined and served.”8 In modern litigation, a diligent counsel can easily become notified via courts’ electronic
filing systems if a complaint has been filed against their client.9 They can
Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (holding Children Internet Protection Act did not violate the First Amendment free speech clause); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S.Ct. 1186 (2018) (discussing extraterritorial application of Stored Communications Act to e-mail accounts); Wynmoor Community
Council, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., 280 F.R.D. 681 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (considering whether forensic
examination of non-profit’s computer by independent computer expert was warranted); Thaler v.
Hirshfeld, —-F.Supp.3d—-, 2021 WL 3934803 (E.D. Va. 2021) (appeal pending) (determining
whether artificial intelligence can be an “inventor” under the Patent Act); Scarborough v. Frederick
Cty. Sch. Bd., 517 F. Supp. 3d 569 (W.D. Va. 2021) (holding parent of student failed to state equal
protection claim based on being blocked from county schools’ social networking platforms).
3
Karel Mazanec, Capping E-Discovery Costs: A Hybrid Solution to E-Discovery Abuse, 56
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 631, 632 (2014).
4
Polly Jean Harrison, Technological Innovation in Law: The Recent Trends in Legal Firm
Adoption, THE FINTECH TIMES (Nov. 25, 2020), https://thefintechtimes.com/technological-innova
tion-in-law-the-recent-trends-in-legal-firm-adoption/.
5
Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Restaurant Inc., 902 F.3d 147 (3rd. Cir. 2018).
6
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
7
Encompass Ins. Co., 902 F.3d at 152-54.
8
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); see § 12:12.50. Snap removal, 1 Bus. & Com. Litig. Fed. Cts.
§ 12:12.50 (4th ed.).
9
See generally, e.g., E-mail Notification Index, ECF, https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/tutor/
current/email/index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2021); Michael Lissner, Announcing PACER Docket
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then quickly remove the matter to federal court by drafting a brief notice
of removal and filing it with the court’s electronic filing system, well
before their client is officially served with the state lawsuit.10
The Third Circuit acknowledged this dilemma: “We are aware of the
concern that technological advances since enactment of the forum defendant rule now permit litigants to monitor dockets electronically, potentially giving defendants an advantage in a race-to-the-courthouse
removal scenario.”11 The Court concluded, however, that while
“[r]easonable minds might conclude that the procedural result demonstrates a need for a change in the law; . . . if such change is required, it is
Congress—not the Judiciary—that must act.”12 The court’s reasoning
here is in line with the general principles of textualism.13
While there is much to commend in this judicial philosophy, and
indeed it has become a dominant approach to jurisprudence in the past
thirty years for good reason, there is a bittersweet irony in its application
in this case. By attempting to enforce the plain meaning of the statute,
defer to the legislature, and kneel before the sacred cow of the text, the
Third Circuit in practice eviscerated the very statute it was trying to uphold. Any attentive litigator can now get around the requirements of
§ 1441(b)(2) and remove to federal court, even where the forum defendant rule would otherwise prevent such removal. A panel made up of a
majority of conservative judges14 applied textualism to a dispute over the
meaning of a statute, and in doing so, rendered that statute toothless due
to the realities of the modern world. Section 1441(b)(2) prevented instate defendants from gaining access to the federal courts? Not so, according to the Third Circuit. Thus, the forum defendant rule is, in effect,
dead—at least in the Third Circuit. The Second and Fifth Circuits, the
only other Circuit Courts to consider the issue to date, have followed the
Third Circuit’s reasoning.15 Concerned with this trend, the House of
Representatives introduced a bill in February 2020 that would curb snap
Alerts for Jounralists, Lawyers, Researchers, and the Public, FREE LAW PROJECT (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://free.law/2018/08/21/announcing-pacer-docket-alerts-for-journalists-lawyers-researchers-andthe-public; Create an alert, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/4815696?hl=EN
(last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
10
See Notice of Removal, Practical Law Standard Document 9-507-0210.
11
Encompass Ins., 902 F.3d at 154, fn. 4.
12
Id. at 154.
13
See generally Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts, at xxi–46, Thomson/West (2012).
14
The Hon. Michael Chagares (who authored the opinion in Encompass) was appointed by
President George W. Bush in 2004; the Hon. Kent Jordan was appointed by President George W.
Bush in 2006; and the Hon. Julio Fuentes was appointed by President Bill Clinton in 2000.
15
See Texas Brine Company, L.L.C. v. American Arbitration Association, Inc., 955 F.3d 482,
486-87 (5th Cir. 2020); Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, 919 F.3d 699, 705-06 (2d Cir.
2019).
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removal by allowing plaintiffs to serve in-state defendants after removal
and require federal courts, in that instance, to remand to state court.16
Maybe that is how it should be. But until the law is amended, snap removal remains a viable litigation tactic for defendants.
This article will explore the tensions between textualism and the realities of modern litigation as revealed in Encompass and its progeny.
Section II explains the underpinnings of textualism. Section III provides
a brief discussion on the basics of removal and the forum defendant rule,
while Section IV then provides an overview of the concept of snap removal. Section V then analyzes the various district court decisions that
have grappled with this issue. Section VI discusses Encompass in detail,
and Section VII provides the reader some with thoughts on the conflict
between textualist philosophy and the impact that applying that philosophy has in practice when considering Encompass and its progeny. Section VIII then asks questions that, the author hopes, will spark further
contemplation and discussion.
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TEXTUALISM
The foundational principle of textualism is that the plain meaning of
the text of a statute at the time that statute was written is the law.17 A
judge’s job is to interpret the text as it is written, no more. The textualist’s “basic presumption [is] legislators enact; judges interpret. And interpret is a transitive verb: judges interpret texts.”18 Justice Antonin Scalia,
one of the key figures in the evolution of textualist thought in the past 50
years, described it this way: “The text is the law, and it is the text that
must be observed.”19 Put another way, “[t]he words of the statute, and
not the intent of the drafters, are the law.”20
Textualists argue that a statute’s passage through the constitutional
process—the passage of the same statutory text by the House of Repre16
See The Removal Jurisdiction Clarification Act of 2020, H.R. 5801, 116th Congress (February 7, 2020).
17
Scalia & Garner, supra n. 13 at xxvii, “Both your authors are textualists: We look for
meaning in the governing text, ascribe to that text the meaning that it has borne from its inception,
and reject judicial speculation about both the drafters’ extratextually derived purposes and the desirability of the fair reading’s anticipated consequences”; at 3 “In an age when democratically prescribed texts (such as statutes, ordinances, and regulations) are the rule, the judge’s principal
function is to give those texts their fair meaning”; at 16 “Textualism, in its purest form, begins and
ends with what the text says and fairly implies.”
18
Id. at xxx.
19
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal
Courts and the Law 3, 22 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (emphasis added).
20
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol’y 59, 60 (1988).
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sentatives and the Senate and either its signature by the President or the
overriding of the President’s veto—provides the only mechanism
through which our Constitution permits the passage of new laws.21 What
one individual legislator, or even one of the two houses of Congress may
say about the law is irrelevant. Only the words that have gone through
the constitutional process have legal force, and it is only those words that
judges are empowered to interpret.22 As Justice Holmes famously
quipped, “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only
what the statute means.”23 Indeed, many textualists contend that judges
are required to uphold statutes even where upholding those statutes lead
to absurd results. As one commentator noted, “Even if a duly enacted
statutory text leads to such [absurd] outcomes, it has still passed through
the procedural requirements mandated by the Constitution and is therefore still law as textualists define it.”24
Further, some judges and legal scholars have opined that relying on
the intent of the legislature is undemocratic.25 As Professor Siegel explained, “[t]extualists grounded these reasons in their appraisal of the
realities of the legislative process.”26 Unelected judges, the argument
goes, may construe the purpose or intent of the law as they see it to
create a result contrary to the actual text of the statute, which was drafted
and passed by democratically elected officials who can be held accountable at the ballot box.27 Furthermore, a federal judge has life tenure, and
so it is challenging (and depending on the judge, nearly impossible), to
hold them accountable to the voters’ will.28 In other words, the people
can hold a democratically elected legislature accountable for an unpopular or poorly written law, but that same electorate is powerless to influence federal judges with life tenure if those judges decide to modify laws
21
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 117,
131 (2009); see also Scalia & Garner, supra n. 13 at 3–46.
22
See Scalia & Garner, supra n. 13 at xxx.
23
Siegel, supra n. 21 at 123 (quoting Scalia, supra n. 20 at 23).
24
Ilya Somin, Is Textualism Doomed?, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. (Online) 235, 238 (2010).
25
See Siegel, supra n. 22
26
Id. at 131.
27
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, by Antonin
Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 531, 567 (2013) (“In cases like Sweet Home,
unelected, life-tenured federal judges are making important policy choices and trying to impose them
upon statutes without regard to congressional goals and compromises and often without due deference to the longstanding policies followed by executive agencies and ratified by Congress. Elected
representatives are accountable to the voters, who not only put them into office based on their policy
positions but can remove them from office if they favor policies out of sync with their electorates.
Although neither elected nor removable by voters, agencies accountable to the President have a
modest accountability advantage over Article III judges, because the President is attentive to voters’
preferences and because agency heads do rotate with the electoral cycles.”).
28
Id.
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based on what they perceive as the underlying purpose or intent of the
statute.
Textualists use these basic ideas to attack their ideological opponents and have done so quite successfully.29 For example, textualists disapprove of attempts to find “legislative intent” beyond the text of the
statute itself.30 Textualists counter that this position does not reflect the
realities of the legislative process. As Professor Siegel noted, “Textualists observed that because a legislature is a multimember body, it may be
unrealistic to assume that it has a collective ‘intent’ on any particular
issue. Such an assumption, textualists observed, inappropriately anthropomorphizes the legislature and ignores its true nature.”31 Focusing on
“intent” allows judges to pick and choose pieces of evidence, and use
them to come to outcomes they favor, regardless of what the text of the
statute itself may say, which runs counter to the general principle that we
are “a government of laws, not of men.”32 Justice Scalia denounced considering “purpose, independent of the language in a statute,”33 and Judge
Easterbrook condemned the “[t]he invocation of disembodied purposes,
reasons cut loose from the language” of the text.34 Legislative intent,
according to textualists, is one such tool beyond the text that judges
should avoid, lest the unsuspecting judge begin applying their own personal preferences and beliefs in their decisions over those of the enacting
legislature.
Textualists criticize reliance on legislative history on similar
grounds. They argue that any piece of legislative history “at most shows
the views of a particular committee or individual member of Congress
and may not reflect the views of the whole, multimember Congress.”35
Textualists also criticize legislative history as being “indeterminate, multifarious, and endlessly manipulable, thus making it just as likely in prac29

Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of
Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1298, 1303 (2018) (“[N]o
judge would proclaim him or herself a ‘purposivist’—Justice Scalia and the textualists have too
successfully denigrated that term for most to embrace it.”).
30
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 419–20 (2005)
31
Siegel, at 132.
32
Scalia & Garner, supra n. 13 at 375; see Siegel, supra n. 21 at 132 (legislative history
gives “judges a ready tool with which to enforce their own personal preferences by plucking out
those snippets of legislative history that favor them”); Gluck & Posner, supra n. 21 at 1314 (Recording one appellate judge as saying some judges looks for tools beyond the text because they “want no
more than to find fellow travelers to support the desired result that their ‘priors’ (to use Dick [Posner]’s word) lead them, much as a drunk uses a lamppost more for support than illumination”).
33
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 325 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
34
Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 310 (7th Cir. 1986).
35
Siegel, supra n. 21 at 132; see also Scalia, supra n. 21 at 32.
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tice to confuse as to help judges.”36 It is easy for any one member of a
legislature to enter language into the legislative history describing what
they see the purpose of a statute to be, or what they believe the intent of
the legislature was when they passed a statute.37 But that does not mean
the rest of the legislature agrees with that interpretation, and there is no
way for a judge to find that out. Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner provided a detailed summary of the Founders’ views on legislative history,
finding that “[t]here was, in short, agreement on the importance of disregarding legislative history.”38 This is because there is no mechanism
whereby the legislature as a whole can affirm or deny statements of individual members, short of voting on the actual text of the statute itself.
Therefore, textualists argue that the better approach is to rely on the language that was agreed to by the whole legislative body, rather than the
statements of one or a few legislators with their own agendas.39 Indeed,
today significant portions of DC law firms’ books of business comes
from artfully crafting legislative history for Congressmen or corporate
clients.40 Beyond that, the use of legislative history, according to textualists, is problematic at a theoretical level because “[i]t assumes what we
are looking for is the intent of the legislature rather than the meaning of
the text.”41 Justice Scalia put it in direct terms when he concluded, “[the]
use of legislative history is not just wrong; it violates constitutional requirements of nondelegability, bicameralism, presidential participation,
and the supremacy of judicial interpretation in deciding the case
presented.”42
This attack on legislative history has been particularly persuasive;
even Justice Kagan has declared that “we are all textualists now.”43 As
36

Siegel, supra n. 21 at 132.
See id. at 131–32.
38
Scalia & Garner, supra n. 13 at 370.
39
See Manning, supra n. 30 at 430 (“Like classical intentionalists, textualists work within the
faithful agent framework; they believe that in our system of government, federal judges have a duty
to ascertain and implement as accurately as possible the instructions set down by Congress (within
constitutional bounds) . . . But textualists deny that a legislature has any shared intention that lies
behind but differs from the reasonable import of the words adopted; that is, they think it impossible
to tell how the body as a whole actually intended (or, more accurately, would have intended) to
resolve a policy question not clearly or satisfactorily settled by the text. Building upon the realist
tradition, textualists do not believe that the premises governing an individual’s intended meaning
translate well to a complex, multi-member legislative process.”)
40
See Scalia & Garner, supra n. 13 at 366–90 (discussing rise of lobbyists drafting legislative
history); Top Lobbying Firms, OpenSecrets.org, https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/toplobbying-firms?cycle=A (last visited Nov. 3, 2021) (“Many lobbying shops are just a small part of a
larger law firm . . .”).
41
Scalia & Garner, supra n. 13 at 375.
42
Id. at 388.
43
Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with Justice Elena
Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
37
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Richard Posner described, “Textualists advanced the canons, in particular, as a more objective and coordinating set of tools for resolving statutory disputes than alternatives like legislative history, and now Justices
of all interpretive stripes use them in most statutory cases.”44 Textualists’
success has prompted most law schools to now offer courses on statutory
interpretation and canons of interpretation, some even during the first
year.45
Textualists attack the underpinnings of purposivism on similar
grounds. Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, known as “the canonical expositors of purposivism,”46 ask courts to assume that statutes are
the work of “reasonable men pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably,
unless the contrary is made unmistakably to appear.”47 But this assumption is problematic, according to textualists. The “cumbersome legislative process,” at both the state and federal levels, with its various “veto
gates,” the threat of a Senate filibuster, and countless other procedural
devices that temper unchecked majoritarianism usually means that any
underlying purposes are not “seamlessly translat[ed]” into legislation.48
What’s more, interest groups exert pressure, individual legislators compromise (many such compromises of the unprincipled variety to obtain
funding or favors for their districts), and wealthy individuals, corporations, and media companies try their best to shape bills to their own
ends.49 Those compromises and negotiations usually take place in private, and the public (and judges) have no way of divining those influwatch?v=DPEtszFT0Tg; see also Siegel, supra n. 21 at 133 (“Intentionalists and purposivists have
absorbed the valuable lesson that textualism’s realism offered: they recognize that judicial reliance
on legislative history, enforcement of legislative intent, or enforcement of statutory purpose can be
fraught with peril for the reasons the textualists offered.”).
44

Gluck & Posner, supra n. 29 at 1304–05.

45

Gluck & Posner, at 1305.
Siegel, supra n. 21 at 132.
47
Id. (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law 1374, 1124-25 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994)).
48
Id. at 132–33 (citing John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387,
2390, 2416-17 (2003)).
49
See id. (“Interest-group politics and the give and take of the legislative process produce
compromises, including potentially unprincipled compromises, and even statutes that pursue no reasonable purpose but simply transfer wealth to powerful groups. Unprincipled interest-group compromises may also take place out of sight and may leave no mark on the legislative record.
Assuming that statutes are the work of reasonable men pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably
may therefore lead courts to reach incorrect conclusions about statutory meaning.” (quotations and
citations omitted)). See generally Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the
Senate (Vintage Books 2002); cf. The Room Where It Happens, Hamilton (2015) (“No one really
knows how the game is played; the art of the trade; how the sausage gets made; we just assume that
it happens . . .”).
46
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ences (i.e. purposes) of the statute.50 Much better to just rely on the
statute’s text and leave it to the legislature to make changes if the courts
are not applying a statute in a way the legislature intended.51
Textualism has gained popularity in recent decades, thanks in part to
the efforts of leading jurists like Justices Scalia, Neil Gorsuch, Brett
Kavanaugh, and Judge Frank Easterbrook.52 It is now widely considered
to be the dominant judicial philosophy.53 But some scholars, even in the
textualist camp believe “textualism is unlikely to win a decisive victory
in the longstanding debate over interpretation.”54 That said, with a conservative 6-3 majority on the Supreme Court, it appears textualism will
remain a powerful force in the development of the law for the foreseeable future.55 Indeed, Richard Posner and Abbe Gluck recently commented that “most Justices [are] now unabashedly of the ‘text-first’
persuasion, opting for dictionaries, interpretive presumptions, and, only
after those materials, a much stingier approach to legislative history.”56
III. REMOVAL AND THE FORUM DEFENDANT RULE
A brief discussion of diversity jurisdiction and removal will help
guide the following discussion and ground the implications of this issue.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.57 To hear a case, they
require specific authority, either from Article III of the Constitution or
from statute.58 One of the most prominent types of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction, which is codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332.59 Under diversity jurisdiction, a federal court has subject-matter
jurisdiction over matters where none of the plaintiffs are citizens of the
same state as any of the defendants, and the amount in controversy ex50

Siegel, n. 21 at 132 (citing Manning, supra n. 30 at 2411–12).
See Scalia & Garner, supra n. 13 at xxx, 391–96.
52
See NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT (2019); Brett Kavanaugh, Fixing
Statutory Interpretation, Judging Statutes 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118 (2016); Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983).
53
See A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan, supra n. 16.
54
Somin, supra n. 24 at 235.
55
For a discussion on the interplay between textualism and conservatism, see Eliot T. Tracz,
Words and Their Meanings: The Role of Textualism in the Progressive Toolbox, 45 Seton Hall
Legis. J. 355, 367-69 (2021) (citations and quotations omitted).
56
Gluck & Posner, supra n. 29 at 1301 (but also noting that “[t]his does not seem to be the
state of affairs in the courts of appeals”).
57
Vulupala v. Barr, 438 F. Supp. 3d 93, 97 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and
the law presumes that ‘a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.’ ”); see also Gen. Motors Corp.
v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end,
with an examination of our jurisdiction.”).
58
See, e.g., Tobin v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 2d 472, 475 (D.N.J. 2001).
59
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
51
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ceeds $75,000.60 The requirement that all defendants are citizens of
states different from all plaintiffs is known as complete diversity.61 However, it is well-established that the plaintiff is the “master of the complaint”62 and can choose whether to bring an action in federal or state
court where concurrent jurisdiction exists, as is the case where the sole
source of federal subject matter jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction.63
Although the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, a defendant is
not left helpless in determining the forum where an action will ultimately
be litigated. A defendant to a civil action in state court may remove the
matter to federal court under certain circumstances prescribed by statute.64 This process is known as removal and is a statutory right.65 Under
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.”66 Therefore, both parties have important tools in determining
where a lawsuit ultimately will be contested. And determining where a
lawsuit will ultimately be contested matters, because where a lawsuit is
fought (either in state or federal court) can impact the outcome.67 For
example, corporate defendants have higher success rates in federal court
and so try to remove state court cases.68

60

Id. § 1332(a).
Grynberg v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 805 F.3d 901, 905 (10th Cir. 2015)
(citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806) (“Diversity jurisdiction
requires complete diversity—no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”).
62
See, e.g., N. Dakota ex rel. Stenehjem v. United States, 418 F. Supp. 3d 427, 438 (D.N.D.
2019) (“The Court first notes that the plaintiff is the master of his complaint and may choose to limit
his claims.”).
63
Bowman v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 423 F. Supp. 3d 1286, 1291 (N.D. Ala. 2019), appeal
dismissed, No. 19-14041-HH, 2020 WL 1847512 (11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2020) (“[A]s ‘the master of his
own claim,’ the law gives greater weight to the plaintiff’s choice of forum. In this way, a
‘[d]efendant’s right to remove and [a] plaintiff’s right to choose his forum are not on equal footing.’ ” (internal citations omitted)).
64
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
65
See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
66
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
67
See Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David McClure, The Elastics of Snap Removal:
An Empirical Case Study of Textualism, 69 Clev. St. L. Rev. 289, 293 (2021) (citing Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 581, 593 (1998) (noting overall plaintiff win rate of fifty-eight percent for cases initially filed in federal court compared to win rate of 37
percent for removed cases)).
68
Id.
61
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However, where removal is based on diversity jurisdiction, this basic
instruction is modified by subsection (b)(2) of the statute.69 It provides
that “[a] civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title [i.e., diversity jurisdiction] may
not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.”70 This is known as the forum defendant rule.71 As the Second
Circuit noted, “In the usual case, application of the forum defendant rule
is straightforward: a defendant is sued in a diversity action in the state
courts of its home state, is served in accordance with state law, attempts
to remove the case, and is rebuffed by a district court applying Section
1441(b)(2).”72
Congress amended this statute in 1948 to include the “properly
joined and served” language to subsection (b)(2).73 Under the revised
language, a defendant can remove a diversity case “only if none of the
parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought.”74 Scholars75 and judges76
have found that the legislative history does not indicate any clear purpose
behind this language, but most agree that the intent was to prevent
gamesmanship by plaintiffs trying to manipulate the forum of a case.77
The logic of the forum defendant rule is tied to the rationale of diversity jurisdiction more generally, which is to say, “to protect out-ofstate litigants from potential bias in state courts against nonresidents by
providing those litigants with a neutral forum in federal court.”78 In other
words, diversity jurisdiction was intended to prevent state courts from
favoring citizens of their own states and to protect out-of-state parties
69

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).

70

Id. (emphasis added).
Valerie M. Nannery, Closing the Snap Removal Loophole, 86 U. Cin. L. Rev. 541, 548

71

(2018).
72

Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 2019).
Nannery, supra n. 71 at 548.
74
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
75
See, e.g., Nannery, supra n. 71 at 548; Main, Stempel, & McClure, supra n. 67 at 294
(noting “there is no legislative history directly on point . . .”).
76
See, e.g., Hawkins v. Cottrell, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1375–78 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (“The
reason behind the addition of the joined and served language is not clear from the legislative history.”); Bowman v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 423 F. Supp. 3d 1286, 1291 (N.D. Ala. 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 19-14041-HH, 2020 WL 1847512 (11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2020).
77
See, e.g., Main, Stempel, & McClure, supra n. 67 at 294 (“[T]he obvious purpose of the
‘joined and served’ language was to prevent gamesmanship by plaintiffs.”); Nannery, supra n. 71 at
548–49.
78
Bowman, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 1291.
73
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from local state court bias.79 But, as the district court in Bowman noted,
“there is no need to protect in-state defendants from prejudice against
nonresidents. . . . For this reason, beginning with the original removal
statute found in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has always limited
the right to remove diverse cases to out-of-state defendants.”80 In that
situation, there is no need to protect a defendant from being subjected to
the judicial power of another state, obviating the need for federal
intervention.
But in 1939 the Supreme Court opened a loophole in removal and
the forum defendant rule with its decision in Pullman Co. v. Jenkins.81
Without delving deeply into this case, the Court basically created a situation where an enterprising plaintiff could defeat removal by naming, but
not serving, an in-state defendant.82 Through this fraudulent joinder process, plaintiffs could keep otherwise removable cases in state court, despite the wishes of the defendants.83 Theoretically, a defendant could
combat this by arguing to a court that the joinder was fraudulent.84 But
after ten years under this scheme, Congress, in 1948, amended the removal statute and added the “properly joined and served” language to the
forum defendant rule in subsection (b)(2) to limit the right of removal
articulated in subsection (a).85 “In this way, the purpose of the ‘properly
joined and served’ addition was ‘to prevent a plaintiff from blocking removal by joining as a defendant a resident party against whom the plaintiff does not intend to proceed.’”86
Under textualist theory this is how the process is supposed to
work.87 The statute as written leads to an unforeseen or unfavorable outcome; the courts apply the law as written regardless of that outcome; and
the legislature responds by amending the law, in this case with the 1948
amendment. For many years, that is how courts interpreted the statute: a
defendant that was a citizen of the state where a state lawsuit was
brought could not remove the matter to federal court, even if the parties
79
Nannery, supra n. 71 at 547 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that federal courts in diversity matters have no local attachments and “will be likely to be
impartial between the different States and their citizens.”).
80
Bowman, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 1291 (internal citations omitted); see also Hawkins v. Cottrell,
Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (concluding, after an exhaustive review of removal statutes and the relevant legislative history, that “from the inception of the removal statute, a
forum defendant has never been allowed to remove a diversity action.”)
81
305 U.S. 534 (1939).
82
See id.; accord Bowman, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 1291.
83
Nannery, supra n. 71 at 547.
84
Pullman, 305 U.S. at 541.
85
Nannery, supra n. 71 at 547–48.
86
Bowman, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 1291–92 (quoting Goodwin v. Reynolds, 757 F.3d 1216, 1221
(11th Cir. 2014)).
87
See generally Scalia & Garner n. 13 at xxvii–xxx.
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are otherwise diverse.88 But then the pendulum swung back, and enterprising defendants began to exploit a different loophole in the statute.
IV. SNAP REMOVAL
Recently, some courts have started accepting the use of a stratagem
known as “snap removal” to circumvent the forum defendant rule as it
was understood after the 1948 amendment.89 Defendants have seized
upon the “properly joined and served” language in § 1441(b)(2) to argue
that they may remove a matter to federal court even where one of the
defendants is a citizen of the state where the initial state action was
brought.90 Such industrious defendants have reasoned that the forum defendant rule only applies where the forum defendant has been properly
joined and served, which, to be fair, is what the plain language of the
statute says.91 Where that condition has not been met, the forum defendant rule would seem not to apply, according to this reading of the statute, and the defendants may avoid the forum defendant rule and remove
to federal court, even where the rule would otherwise prevent such removal if the forum defendant had been served.92
Courts tried to skirt this issue for years. In 1992, for example, a
court in the District of South Carolina in Wensil v. E.I. Dupont De
Nemours & Co., considered the “properly joined and served” language of
Section 1441(b), and concluded, “The presence of unserved resident defendants does not defeat removal where complete diversity exists.”93 The
Wensil court noted, “Courts have routinely held that Section 1441(b)
does not permit a non-resident defendant to remove an action to federal
court before the resident defendant is served, if joinder of the resident
defendant defeats diversity jurisdiction.”94 But that court ultimately
noted that in that case “complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all
defendants” existed and so permitted non-resident defendants to remove
88

See Nannery, supra n. 71 at 548–49.
Id. at 550. Although the term “snap removal” appears to have become the most popular
term for this procedural device, others have referred to the practice by different names such as “preservice removal,” “early removal,” “jack rabbit removal,” and “race to remove.” Main, Stempel, &
McClure at 294 n. 67 (citing to cases using various names). This article uses the most commonly
accepted name of “snap removal.”
90
See Nannery, supra n. 13 at 548–49.
91
Id. at 550–51.
92
Main, Stempel, & McClure, supra n. 67 at 295.
93
Wensil v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 792 F. Supp. 447, 449 (D.S.C. 1992) (“The
Court recognizes that the plaintiffs are being deprived of their original choice of forum merely
because the South Carolina defendants are served after the non-resident defendants. However, this
fortuitous result could have been prevented by serving a South Carolina resident defendant first.”).
94
Id. (citing Workman v. National Supaflu Systems, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 690 (D.S.C. 1987)).
89
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to federal court in South Carolina before the South Carolina defendants
had been served, effectively avoiding the issue head on.95
The Northern District of Texas tried to tackle this issue in 1998 in
Recognition Communications, Inc. 96 where the judge mused that “neither
party has cited a case and the Court has been unable to locate a decision
where the precise procedural facts of this case were present.”97 In that
case, a Nevada plaintiff filed breach contract claims against four defendants, including one Texas defendant in Texas state court.98 The plaintiff
alerted the defendants to the lawsuit before serving them, and the three
non-Texas defendants then removed the case to the Northern District of
Texas before receiving service, under the snap removal theory.99 The
court was unconvinced and remanded the case to state court.100 But since
then, lawyers in hundreds of cases, all seeming adherents to textualism—
at least where it will best serve their clients—have advanced this argument in an attempt to gain access to federal court.101
Before the proliferation of the Internet and electronic filing systems,
this quirky procedure was little known, little used, and mainly of interest
only to civil procedure professors. However, with the advance of technology, this textual interpretation has become more relevant, and more
useful to practitioners.102 Sharp-eyed lawyers with clients prone to litigation can easily set an electronic alert for any filing against them.103
Before the filing party can hope to serve them, those lawyers can file for
removal to the local federal district where venue is proper. Alternatively,
attorneys who engage in the practice of providing courtesy copies of
complaints to defendants now run the risk of a race to the courthouse and
potential removal to federal court.
95

Id.
Recognition Commc’ns., Inc. v. American Auto. Ass’n, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:97-CV-0945-P,
1998 WL 119528, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 1998).
97
Id. at n.3.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
See id.
101
Nannery, supra n. 71 at 550–51.
102
See, e.g., id. at 545; Main, Stempel, & McClure, supra n. 67; Jeffrey W. Stempel et al.,
Snap Removal: Concept; Cause; Cacophony; and Cure, 72 Baylor L. Rev. 423 (2020); Snap Removal After Texas Brine: Considerations for Forum Defendants in the Fifth Circuit, Jones Day
(Aug. 2020). https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/08/snap-removal-after-texas-brine-consid
erations-for-forum-defendants-in-the-fifth-circuit.
103
See generally, e.g., E-mail Notification Index, ECF, https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/tutor/current/email/index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2021); Michael Lissner, Announcing PACER
Docket Alerts for Jounralists, Lawyers, Researchers, and the Public, FREE LAW PROJECT (Aug. 21,
2018), https://free.law/2018/08/21/announcing-pacer-docket-alerts-for-journalists-lawyers-researchers-and-the-public; Create an alert, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/
4815696?hl=EN (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
96
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V. DISTRICT COURTS SPLIT
District courts have been split on how to handle this phenomenon.104
That split, and the implications of either permitting or denying snap removal, have forced judges into “fairly extreme versions of textualism
and purposivism.”105 Indeed, some scholars have commented, “this statute has an unusual quality that forces judges into one interpretive camp
or the other.”106 Generally, these two camps can be described thus: on
one hand are judges who, when faced with the plain language of
§ 1441(b), balk at the implications of applying that plain language, and
focus on the intent and purpose of the statute to reject attempts at snap
removal; and on the other hand are judges who rely on textualist principles to apply that plain language, regardless of its practical implications,
and allow snap removal.
A recent study concluded that before 2006, snap removal had not
gained much traction in the federal courts.107 On the one hand are courts
that have rejected snap removal arguments. But within that universe of
cases, judges have adopted a variety of reasonings to justify the decision
to remand cases. Recognition hued a narrow road, emphasizing the fact
that none of the defendants had yet been served, and so “[g]iven this
scenario, the removal was improper because it excluded [a resident defendant], and the Court does not need to determine whether the consent
of [a resident defendant], after being issued service of process, was
timely or proper.”108 The Recognition Court stressed, “if Plaintiff had
served one of the non-resident Defendants, this case could have been
properly removed by the served Defendant under Section 1441(b), regardless of the presence of a resident defendant.”109 But because none of
the defendants had been served at the time of removal, the citizenship of
all of the defendants had to be considered.110 The court emphasized the
“limited scope of this decision.”111 This limited holding and reasoning
received support from another case in the Northern District of Texas
three years later.112
104

See Nannery, supra n. 71 at 552–56.
Main, Stempel, & McClure, supra n. 67 at 289.
106
Id. at 296.
107
Nannery, supra n. 71 at 552–54.
108
Recognition, 1998 WL 119528, at *3.
109
Id.
110
See id.
111
Id. at n. 2.
112
See Davis v. Cash, 2001 WL 1149355, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2001) (“This result is
supported by Judge Solis’ opinion in Recognition . . . where the Court noted that service of a
resident Defendant would constitute proper grounds for removal where the non-resident Defendants
had not been served and complete diversity existed between the parties.”). But see Maitra v. Mitsub105
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Other courts stressed the perceived injustice of basing removal on a
race to the courthouse. A court in the District of Maryland drew on tangentially analogous cases from the Supreme Court113 and the Eighth Circuit114 to lend support to its conclusion that a defendant should not be
rewarded for winning a race to the courthouse, and that snap removal
would ultimately expand the scope of removal, rather than act as a restriction on it as Congress intended.115 The court in Oxendine concluded
that “removability can not [sic] rationally turn on the timing or sequence
of service of process.”116 This reasoning garnered support from several
other district courts.117
Still other courts have focused on the policy implications of snap
removal in a modern world with easy access to electronic dockets and
attempted to emphasize the purpose of the statute to get around its plain
meaning. In Laugelle v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., the court reasoned
rejecting a snap removal request “makes particular sense today given the
shift to electronic docketing and the increased potential for gamesmanship by savvy defendants who may monitor State Court dockets.”118 In
Fields v. Organon USA Inc., the court worried, “blindly applying the
plain ‘properly joined and served’ language of § 1441(b) . . . eviscerate[s] the purpose of the forum defendant rule” and “creates an opportunity for gamesmanship by the defendants, which could not have been the
intent of the legislature in drafting the ‘properly joined and served’ language.”119 A court in the Northern District of Illinois went one step further and decided the “joined and served” language does not “make[ ]
sense” and may even be “wholly unnecessary” in the context of snap
ishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., No. CIV.A.SA01CA0209FBNN, 2002 WL 1491855, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar.
29, 2002) (declining to adopt reasoning of Recognition).
113
Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 59 S.Ct. 347, 83 L.Ed. 334 (1939) (holding where a
non-separable controversy involves a resident defendant, the fact that the resident defendant has not
been served with process does not justify removal by the non-resident defendant).
114
Pecherski v. General Motors Corp., 636 F.2d 1156, 1160–61 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding the
enactment of § 1441(b) did not qualify the requirement of complete diversity; rather, it “further
limited jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship by requiring that no joined and served defendants be a citizen of the state in which the action was initially brought”).
115
Oxendine v. Merck & Co., Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 517, 524 (D. Md. 2002).
116
Id. at 526.
117
See, e.g., Khashan v. Ghasemi, 2010 WL 1444884, *2, (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010); Nottebohm v. Am. Home Mortg. Corp., No. C 11-01838 SI, 2011 WL 3678841, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
22, 2011); Carpenter v. Apotex Corp., No. 08-60526-CIV, 2008 WL 11332029, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 8, 2008); Laugelle v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. CIV.A. 10-1080 GMS, 2012 WL
368220, at *3 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2012).
118
2012 WL 368220, at *3 (citing Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F.Supp.2d 726, 734–35 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
119
Fields v. Organon USA Inc., 2007 WL 4365312 at *4 (D.N.J. Dec.12, 2007).
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removal.120 Unnecessary as the language may be, it is still the language
of the statute.
But other courts came to different conclusions, holding that snap
removal may be acceptable in certain situations. The first example of this
seems to be Wensil, where the District of South Carolina concluded that
non-resident defendants could theoretically remove to federal court in
South Carolina before the South Carolina defendants had been served.121
Other early adopters of this strategy included a court in the Southern
District of Indiana, which held that if the in-state defendants had not
been served at the time of removal, an out-of-state defendant may remove where there is complete diversity.122
Several judges favored a textualist interpretation of § 1441(b)(2).123
The Northern District of California emphasized that just because the outcome may be “unfair” that did not give the court a “compelling reason to
depart from the plain text of section 1441(b).”124 The Southern District
of Illinois relied on this same interpretation in Massey v. Cassens &
Sons, Inc. 125 holding, “While an argument can be made that the likely
policy underlying the ‘joined-and-served’ requirement is not implicated
by the current facts, the Court is constrained by the language of 28
U.S.C. § 1441. That language is clear and unambiguous: where complete
diversity is present—as it is in this case—only the presence of a ‘joinedand-served’ resident defendant defeats removal.”126 Some judges in the
District of New Jersey were also critical of the purposivist approach
taken by other courts.127 These courts, by and large, admitted to differing
extents that their holdings led to problematic or “unfair” outcomes, but
120

Holmstrom v. Harad, 2005 WL 1950672, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2005).
Wensil, 792 F. Supp. at 449 (“The Court recognizes that the plaintiffs are being deprived
of their original choice of forum merely because the South Carolina defendants are served after the
non-resident defendants. However, this fortuitous result could have been prevented by serving a
South Carolina resident defendant first.”).
122
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 826, 828 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
123
See Nannery, supra n. 71 at 552–53 (discussing several early cases focusing on the plain
language of § 1441(b)).
124
Waldon v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. C07-01988 MJJ, 2007 WL 1747128, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. June 18, 2007); see also City of Ann Arbor Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Gecht, No. C-06-7453EMC,
2007 WL 760568, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007) (“[I]f Congress had wanted to ensure that removal
would not be appropriate until it was clear that Plaintiff was trying to prevent removal by speciously
naming resident defendants, Congress could have provided that no removal petition could be filed
until one or more nonresident defendant had been joined and served. The statute also could have
been written to give a plaintiff, e.g., 30 or 60 days to effect service before permitting a defendant to
remove. In any event, Plaintiff has not cited anything in the legislative history of § 1441(b) to support its assertion that the plain language of the statute should be disregarded.”).
125
Massey v. Cassens & Sons, Inc., 2006 WL 381943, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2006).
126
Id.
127
See, e.g., Frick v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. Civ. 05-5429(DRD), 2006 WL 454360, at
*2-3 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2006); Ripley v. Eon Labs Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 137, 140-41 (D.N.J. 2007).
121
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determined to apply a textualist approach to these cases. Under this rationale, whether it was the forum or non-forum defendant who removed
was immaterial.128 By 2010, decisions permitting snap removal were becoming prevalent in district courts across the country.129 Indeed, a recent
survey found that “more than half of judges [today] allow” snap
removal.130
This approach has an obvious appeal to textualist judges. It is simple. It is elegant. The language is clear. Where that is the case, textualists
reasoned, it is the judge’s job to enforce the statute. It did not matter if
that outcome expanded federal diversity jurisdiction. It did not matter if
the outcome meant overriding the limited purpose of diversity jurisdiction, turning diversity jurisdiction into a race to the courthouse rather
than a venue to protect out-of-state parties from the prejudices of a state
court. Leave it to the legislature to fix those problems. How could the
underlying rationale and philosophical underpinnings of a statute hope to
contend with the plain text? Afterall, “it is the text’s meaning, and not
the content of anyone’s expectations or intentions, that binds us as
law.”131
Despite this upsurge in snap removal, not all courts became convinced the procedure was permissible, and the controversy continues in
the absence of controlling case law from the courts of appeals.132 Courts
have employed a wide variety of legal reasoning and interpretive canons
to lead to divergent results. This has led to a deep split among the district
courts and a conflicting series of cases, differing as much in reasoning as
in outcome. But at bottom, some courts relied on purpose and intent,
while others relied on the plain meaning of the text. Given the unique
features of snap removal, the courts were forced to pick a side. Depending on what approach those courts took, they ended up with very different results.
VI. THIRD CIRCUIT IN Encompass
In 2018, the Third Circuit took up the issue of snap removal in Encompass Insurance Co. v. Stone Mansion Restaurant, Inc.133 The En128
See, e.g., Hutchins v. Bayer Corp., No. 08-640-JJF-LPS, 2009 WL 192468, at *8 (D. Del.
Jan. 23, 2009).
129
See Nannery, supra n. 71 at 554, n.72.
130
Main, Stempel, & McClure, supra n. 67 at 295.
131
Laurence H. Tribe, “Comment,” in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal
Courts and the Law 65, 65 (1997).
132
See Nannery, supra n. 71 at 552–56 (detailing push back from some district courts after
other district courts began permitting snap removal).
133
Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest. Inc., 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018).
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compass court used a variety of canons of interpretation in its analysis,
trying to reconcile the conflicting positions of the district courts. On the
one hand, those courts that held that the unambiguous text of the statute
was clear and so must be applied as written,134 and on the other hand,
those courts that reasoned such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of diversity jurisdiction and go against congressional intent.135 Ultimately, the court determined the plain language of the statute permitted
snap removal, and that such an outcome was not so absurd as to prevent
that result.
A summary of the facts of the case is helpful. Encompass, a citizen
of Illinois, brought an action against Stone Mansion Restaurant, a Pennsylvania corporation, in Pennsylvania state court.136 Over email between
the parties’ counsel, Stone Mansion’s counsel agreed to accept electronic
service of process instead of requiring formal service.137 Stone Mansion’s counsel told Encompass’s counsel that “[i]n the event your client
chooses to file suit in this matter, I will be authorized to accept service of
process” and that “if and when you do file, provide your Complaint to
me along with an Acceptance form.”138 Counsel for Encompass replied a
few minutes later, noting, “[t]hank you . . . for agreeing to accept service.”139 On January 23, 2017, Encompass sent Stone Mansion a copy of
the filed complaint and a service acceptance form via email.140 Counsel
for Stone Mansion replied, “I will hold the acceptance of service until I
get the docket n[umber].”141 Later that day, Encompass’s counsel provided the docket number; however, Stone Mansion did not return the
acceptance form.142 Three days later, counsel for Stone Mansion
responded:
Thank you for your patience in this regard. . . . I want to explain
why I have not yet returned the Acceptance of Service form. Noting
that there is diversity of citizenship, and an amount in controversy in
excess of $75,000, we are considering removing this action to federal
court. While 28 USC [sic] § 1441(b) generally prevents a resident defendant from removing an action to federal court in its own state, the
language of the statute precludes such removal when a resident defendant has been “properly joined and served”. We are aware of an opin134

See, e.g., Gecht, No. C-06-7453EMC, 2007 WL 760568, at *9.
See, e.g., Holmstrom, 2005 WL 1950672, at *1–2.
136
Encompass, 902 F.3d at 149.
137
Id. at 150.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
135
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ion from Chief Judge Conti in the Western District of PA, interpreting
this to mean that a resident defendant can remove prior to being
served. I fully acknowledge having agreed prior to your filing suit that
we will accept service. I maintain that agreement, but because it may
affect our client’s procedural ability to remove the case, I have to hold
off doing so until after the Notice of Removal is filed. I expect this
will happen in the next one or two days. Happy to discuss this with
you over the phone if you desire.143

Before Stone Mansion formerly accepted service, it filed for removal in the Western District of Pennsylvania.144 Encompass filed a motion to remand to the state trial court, arguing that removal was improper
pursuant to the forum defendant rule; however, the District Court denied
the motion.145 The District Court instead held that the forum defendant
rule did not apply because it precludes removal only “if any of the parties
in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the
State in which [the] action is brought” and because Stone Mansion’s
counsel “did not accept service of [Encompass’] Complaint until after [it]
filed a Notice of Removal.”146
Encompass Insurance appealed the district court’s decision denying
their motion to remand.147 On appeal, Encompass argued that the district
court’s interpretation ignored the intent of the statute and construed it “in
a manner that necessarily would create a nonsensical result that Congress
could not have intended.”148 The Court of Appeals began its analysis by
noting that, where there is an applicable statute, it must begin with the
text of that statute.149 The court concluded that where the text of the
statute is unambiguous, “the statute should be enforced as written and
only the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions in the legislative history will justify a departure from that language.”150 However, the
Third Circuit recognized the basic principle of statutory interpretation
that the courts should interpret a law in a way that avoids “absurd or
bizarre results.”151 However, the Third Circuit cautioned that an absurd
result had a narrow definition, and was only one that “defies rationality
or renders the statute nonsensical and superfluous.”152
143

Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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at 151.
at 152.
(citing McMaster v. E. Armored Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 167, 170 (3d Cir. 2015)).
(citing In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 338 (3d Cir. 2006)).
(citing United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2013)).
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With these tools of statutory construction laid out, the Court began
dissecting the statute’s text. The Court quickly held that the language of
the statute was unambiguous.153 Its plain meaning precluded removal
only where the in-state defendant had been properly joined and served.154
Where the language was clear, only the most compelling contrary evidence could permit the court to depart from that plain meaning.155 The
question then became whether the legislative history had a “most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions” or whether the literal interpretation of the statute would lead to “absurd or bizarre results.”156 The
Court was constructing an escape hatch, but a narrow one. Ultimately, it
refused to use that door.
Addressing the purpose of the statute, the Third Circuit noted that
the forum defendant rule was made “in part” to prevent a state court from
favoring an in-state defendant and to prevent discrimination against outof-state litigants.157 However, the Court differentiated this general purpose with the specific purpose of the “properly joined and served” language in the statute.158 The purpose of this language was, in the Court’s
mind, “less obvious.”159 It concluded that the legislative history was inconclusive, but noted that other courts and some commentators had theorized that Congress enacted the rule “to prevent a plaintiff from blocking
removal by joining as a defendant a resident party against whom it does
not intend to proceed, and whom it does not even serve.”160 Encompass
argued this fraudulent joinder rationale meant that Congress would not
have intended to allow an in-state defendant to circumvent the rule by
delaying formal service of process.
The Third Circuit found this argument unavailing. It reasoned that
Congress included the fraudulent joinder language to prevent the specific
problem of fraudulent joinder by a plaintiff.161 Under this reading of the
purpose of the “properly joined and served” language, permitting an instate defendant to remove before being served would not contravene
Congress’s intent.162 The Court provided three reasons why this interpretation did not lead to an absurd result. First, it adhered to the plain mean153
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Id. (quoting Arthur Hellman, et al., Neutralizing the Strategem of “Snap Removal”: A
Proposed Amendment to the Judicial Code, 9 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 103, 108 (2016)).
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ing of the text.163 Second, it only expands the right to removal in the
uncommon circumstance where a defendant is aware of a lawsuit before
being served.164 Third, it protects the purpose of the statute without rendering any language superfluous.165
The Third Circuit admitted that “this result may be peculiar” but
concluded that the outcome was not “so outlandish as to constitute an
absurd or bizarre result.”166 The Court also acknowledged that technological advances had made the electronic monitoring of dockets easier
since the forum defendant rule was written.167 However, it was satisfied
that it did not need to address those concerns because that issue was not
briefed by the parties and because the legislature could deal with those
changing circumstances if it wanted.168 The court finished by noting that
“[r]easonable minds might conclude that the procedural result demonstrates a need for a change in the law; however, if such change is required, it is Congress — not the Judiciary—that must act.”169 Shrug.
The Second and Fifth Circuits have heavily relied on the Third Circuit’s reasoning to reach the same conclusions on snap removal.170 Both
Courts began with the statute’s text,171 and found the statute’s plain language to be unambiguous.172 The Second Circuit in Gibbons concluded
that “[b]y its text . . . Section 1441(b)(2) is inapplicable until a homestate defendant has been served in accordance with state law; until then,
a state court lawsuit is removable under Section 1441(a) so long as a
federal district court can assume jurisdiction over the action.”173 The
Second Circuit in Gibbons explained that, “[t]he statute plainly provides
that an action may not be removed to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship once a home-state defendant has been ‘properly joined
and served.’”174 The Fifth Circuit in Texas Brine Co. also held that “the
statute’s plain language allows snap removal.”175 Therefore, unless the
163
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 154.
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Id.
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Id. at 153, n. 3.
169
Encompass, 902 F.3d at 154.
170
See Texas Brine Company, L.L.C. v. American Arbitration Association, Inc., 955 F.3d
482, 486-87 (5th Cir. 2020); Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, 919 F.3d 699, 705-06 (2d
Cir. 2019).
171
Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 705 (“Every exercise in statutory construction must begin with the
words of the text.”) (quoting Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003)); Texas
Brine Co., LLC, 955 F.3d at 486.
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Id.
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Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 705.
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Id.
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Texas Brine Co., LLC, 955 F.3d at 486.
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statute’s plain language led to an absurd result, both Circuits held they
were bound by the text of the statute.176
The Fifth Circuit stressed the “high bar” of the absurd result doctrine, favorably citing Justice Scalia’s statement that “[t]he result must be
preposterous, one that ‘no reasonable person could intend.’”177 The Fifth
Circuit went on to note that snap removal was “at least rational” and so
the absurd result doctrine should not apply.178 The Second Circuit
agreed, noting that “while it might seem anomalous to permit a defendant
sued in its home state to remove a diversity action, . . . the language of
the statute cannot be simply brushed aside. Allowing a defendant that has
not been served to remove a lawsuit to federal court ‘does not contravene’ Congress’s intent to combat fraudulent joinder.”179 In fact, there
could have been multiple reasons why the Congress wrote the statute the
way it did: “Congress may well have adopted the ‘properly joined and
served’ requirement in an attempt to both limit gamesmanship and provide a bright-line rule keyed on service, which is clearly more easily
administered than a fact-specific inquiry into a plaintiff’s intent or opportunity to actually serve a home-state defendant.”180 In other words, there
were at least some rational reasons why Congress would write the statute
the way it did, and the Second Circuit would not question those rationales under the absurd results doctrine.
Both circuits settled on the plain language, concluding that it was the
role of the legislature to amend the statute if the statute’s current language led to an undesirable result. The Fifth Circuit concluded that “[t]he
plain-language reading of the forum-defendant rule as applied in this
case does not justify a court’s attempt to revise the statute.”181 Even
though courts typically construe removal narrowly and favor remand,
“we do not have ‘any doubt about the propriety of removal’ because, as
discussed, the text is unambiguous.”182 The Second Circuit was likewise
satisfied that the outcome was “authorized by the text.”183 The Fifth Circuit ended its opinion with language similar to that of the Third Circuit,
warning that “[w]e are not the final editors of statutes, modifying lan-
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See Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 705; Texas Brine Co., LLC, 955 F.3d at 486.
Texas Brine Co., LLC, 955 F.3d at 486 (quoting Scalia & Garner, supra n. 13 at 237).
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Id.
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Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 706 (quoting Encompass Ins., 902 F.3d at 153).
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Id.
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Texas Brine Co., LLC, 955 F.3d at 487.
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Id. (quoting Gasch v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281-82 (5th Cir.
2007)).
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Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 707.
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guage when we perceive some oversight.”184 That role is reserved for the
legislature, the Fifth Circuit concluded.185
Thus, all three Circuits to have considered the issue of snap removal
have relied on a textualist approach to conclude (1) that the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, (2) the absurd results doctrine is
inapplicable because there are rational reasons Congress might have
written the statute the way it did, and (3) it is for Congress, and not the
courts to address this situation. As a result of these opinions, the scope of
removal has significantly broadened in these three Circuits.
VII. CONFLICTS IN TEXTUALISM: THEORY V. REALITY
Encompass and its progeny are well-reasoned, and clearly and correctly apply the textualist’s tools of statutory interpretation to the forum
defendant rule. One can almost hear Justice Scalia’s approval echoing
from his 1997 Tanner Lecture: “It is the law that governs, not the intent
of the lawgiver.”186 Encompass is an exemplary opinion in the textualist
model and has many redeeming qualities. A law student and, indeed, a
practitioner or academic, could learn a great deal from the succinct style
and crisp reasoning.
But take a step back from the granular analysis of canons of interpretation. See the forest, not just the trees. Encompass rendered the forum defendant rule virtually meaningless in modern litigation. It is all
well and good for a court to hold that a result adheres to the plain text
and does not lead to an absurd result when narrowly defined to the clause
at issue. The Encompass Court abided by the underlying philosophy of
textualism and used the text as their anchor.187 The Court then limited
the efficacy of its other tools by emphasizing how narrowly defined the
absurd result and extraordinary showing of contrary intentions exceptions were.188 Some commentators have identified this growing tendency
among textualists to adhere too much to the text.189 These commentators
worry that the underlying rationale of textualism will lead the courts to
rely on safety valves, like the absurd result canon less and less.190 Others
have responded that this “may be a strength of textualism rather than a
184

Texas Brine Co., LLC, 955 F.3d at 486.
Interestingly, although somewhat tangential to this article, the Fifth Circuit did not limit its
holding to non-forum defendants, but noted that it was “[o]f some importance” that “the removing
party” was “not a forum defendant.” Id. at 487.
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Scalia, supra n. 19 at 92.
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See supra Section VI.
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See supra Section VI.
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See Siegel, supra n. 21.
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weakness in a society with deep ideological disagreements over what
counts as ‘absurd.’”191 Whether or not this narrowing of the absurdity
doctrine is a good idea, this seems to be what happened in Encompass,
and could quite possibly continue to happen in other circumstances moving forward. In effect, the court had a small life raft of exceptions that it
punched with holes, and then dragged it to the bottom of the ocean with a
heavy anchor of text. And the result was the forum defendant rule itself,
clinging for dear life in the turbulent seas of modern litigation and electronic docket monitoring, drowned.
Today, any attorney can electronically monitor dockets.192 They can
even set alerts if a client is mentioned in a recently filed complaint.193
Additionally, it is common practice for a plaintiff’s counsel to email defendant’s counsel and ask the counsel to accept electronic service.194
This practice makes sense, as it streamlines the service of process and
allows the parties to get to work faster on the merits of the case. But
under the reasoning of Encompass, any of those defendants can remove
the case to federal court, regardless of citizenship of the defendant, so
long as they can file a notice of removal before being physically
served.195 This will almost always be the case.
The forum defendant rule held that an in-state defendant could not
remove an otherwise diverse case to federal court.196 Encompass concluded the forum defendant rule meant that an in-state defendant could
remove, so long as it did so before being served.197 With today’s technology, that equates to the proposition that an in-state defendant can remove
a diverse case. In two logical steps, the combination of textualism and
modern technology rendered a statute meaningless.
Encompass, then, provides us with a stark example of the dangers of
textualist formalism as many judges apply it today. As Justice Kagan
acknowledged, the basic principles of textualism make sense.198 Judges
would do well to adhere to the text of the statute where it is clear. It is
where any good judge should begin their analysis. It provides notice to
litigants of what the law is, and it respects the democratic process. But
there have to be some mechanisms in place—safety valves, life rafts, or
191

Somin, supra n. 24 at 236.
See PACER Homepage, https://pacer.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
193
See supra n. 10.
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Cf. Encompass, 902 F.3d at 150.
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See supra Section VI.
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See supra Section III.
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See supra Section VI.
198
See Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with Justice
Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=DPEtszFT0Tg.
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whatever analogy one would like to use—to ensure that judges do not go
too far and render the statute they are attempting to enforce meaningless.
Perhaps the answer, as it is in so many parts of life, is moderation
and pragmatism. As one legal scholar noted, “[e]ven if Siegel is correct
about the radicalizing logic of textualism, textualist judges may not follow it to its limits. Unlike legal scholars, judges are chosen by a political
process that does not emphasize adherence to broad theories of interpretation. Few judges feel a strong imperative to push logical consistency to
its limits. They may well be content to make use of textualist methodology without acting on all the logical implications of doing so.”199 Maybe
this debate over differing interpretations has become “boring” and judges
can and will use all the tools at their disposal to come to the “right”
result.200 As one commentator recently concluded, “There may be an
emerging consensus that most judges fulfill their judicial role pragmatically, drawing sensibly from legislative history and other indicia of intent—with some judges invoking interpretive tools more frequently and
liberally than others.”201 Richard Posner, in a recent survey of 42 federal
courts of appeals judges concluded:
The approach that emerged most clearly from our interviews is not a
single approach at all but rather what might be described as intentional
eclecticism. As we elaborate in the next Part of the Article, most of the
judges we spoke to are willing to consider many different kinds of
material. They told us it was “defensible to gather as much information as you can to make the best-informed decision you can” and that
they eschewed an “ecclesiastical” ideology. Many acknowledged the
need for pragmatism— judging with common sense and an eye on
consequences. Some judges offered a frank acknowledgment that
sometimes the work of statutory interpretation is “quasilegislative.”202

Perhaps these courts of appeals judges have the right idea. Perhaps a
flexible textualism is possible and preferable in the face of rapid technological change.

199

Somin, supra n. 24 at 236.
See Gluck & Posner, supra n. 29 at 1300-01 (referring to the debate between textualism
and purposivism as “boring”).
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Main, Stempel, & McClure, supra n. 67 at 291 (citing various recent academic articles).
202
Gluck & Posner, supra n. 29 at 1302-03.
200

https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol52/iss2/2

26

Elgin: Technology & Textualism: A Case Study

2022]

Technology & Textualism

123

VIII. TEXTUALISM AND TECHNOLOGY
Judges need these tools of interpretation and the flexibility they provide more than ever today because of the pace of technological advance,
and its continued implementation in the legal profession. How will textualism adapt to a world of rapid technological change? How can it avoid
the outcome of Encompass and its progeny? Or is it better to put the onus
on the legislature to amend statutes where a reading of the text, combined with modern technology, renders the statute meaningless? Deferring to the legislature seems particularly troubling today, where the pace
of change is ever increasing, and Congress seems less able than ever to
pass meaningful legislation. It seems unlikely the bill in the House of
Representatives meant to address this issue will become law anytime
soon.203
The intent of this article was not to criticize textualism as a theory. It
has been an important contribution to legal thought and jurisprudence,
and has more benefits than drawbacks. Rather, this article hoped to highlight an example of the problems inherent in applying a textualist approach to a statute today. The legal world has been criticized at times for
failing to evolve in the face of ever-quickening change.204 Textualists
face a unique challenge, in that their jurisprudential philosophy is perhaps the most uncompromising and the least capable of flexibility and
adaptation in the face of change.205 A court must adhere to the plain text
of the statute unless some narrow exception applies. How do judges determine what an absurd result would be from a purely practical standpoint? More often, their analysis focuses on an absurd legal result, not a
practical one. Encompass provides such an example. The result, while
strange, was not so absurd as to require judicial intervention. Justice
Scalia and Bryan Garner define the absurd results doctrine narrowly, in
order to avoid “a slippery slope” towards judicial activism.206 They limit
the doctrine to cases where “(1) [t]he absurdity must consist of a disposition that no reasonable person could intend . . .”207 In their fear of
purposivism, they have restricted an otherwise powerful tool for the
modern judge to combat the worst effects of technology on making stat203

See The Removal Jurisdiction Clarification Act of 2020, H.R. 5801, 116th Congress (February 7, 2020).
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See e.g., Reid Trautz, If Times They Are a-Changing, Why Aren’t Lawyers Too?, LAW
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utes redundant, as in the case of snap removal. Only “where the absurdity
and injustice of applying the provision to the case would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in reject the application” may the judge apply this otherwise useful canon.208 There
appears to be little, if any, room for practical considerations in such a
strict application of this canon. And judges appear to be using these canonical tools less and less and relying solely on the text more and
more.209
This article has shown how a sound textualist application to a statute
opens the door for technological advances to render that statute meaningless. The very statute the textualist judge reveres becomes useless when
that judge fails to act to address the shifting technological landscape. But
how can textualism account for technological change while remaining
true to the text? The text is, after all, the only thing imbued with the legal
force provided by the procedures laid out in the Constitution. Perhaps
textualists can glean lessons from Lawrence Lessig’s work on fidelity in
translation,210 and find a way to allow for changes in constitutional reading even when there has been no change in the constitutional text. If
meaning is a function of both text and context, then even textualists will
have to contend with changes in the world and their impact on the law
and the text.
Ultimately, there are no easy answers to the questions facing textualism today. Can a judge go outside the words of the statute? Should they?
Are judges really the people best to predict how modern technology may
impact a situation, and how best to address the resulting issues? More
importantly, how should a judge balance and weigh these competing
concerns? Does this not just reopen many of the problems inherent in
intentionalism and purposivism? How can a textualist judge hope to keep
the bigger picture in mind? How can he look up from the page and see
the wider world when the text is all that matters? How can he see the
forest as well as the trees?
CONCLUSION
The forum defendant rule had an underlying purpose: to prevent favoritism to in-state defendants and to prevent discrimination against out208

1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 427, at 303.
See generally Siegel, supra n. 21.
210
See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165, 1166 (1993) (“[T]his
essay argues that any complete account of interpretive fidelity must allow—indeed require—
changes in constitutional readings even when there has been no change in the constitutional text. If
meaning is a function of both text and context, the claim made here is that fidelity in interpretation
must accommodate changes in both.”).
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of-state defendants.211 But enterprising lawyers studied the statute and
reasoned that they could avoid removal by naming an in-state defendant
and then failing to serve them or otherwise pursue the claim against
them.212 In a possible attempt to counter this tactic, Congress amended
the statute to say that only defendants “properly joined and served” could
not be removed.213 In response, creative lawyers developed the novel
strategy of snap removal.214 District courts continue to be split on
whether this is permitted under the statute.215 But the Third Circuit, the
first appellate court to take on this thorny issue, held that the statute
allowed this strategy.216 The Second and Fifth Circuits then relied on this
decision to reach the same conclusion.217 When combined with modern
technology, such as electronic docket monitoring, this textualist opinion
rendered the statute toothless. Any in-state defendant with an alert attorney can now side-step the forum defendant rule and remove to federal
court so long as they do so before service is properly effectuated.
Encompass is an excellent opinion on the page, but it exposes a
problem for textualism moving forward. The combination of an inflexible doctrine that hesitates to consider factors beyond the text, along with
rapidly evolving technology, will likely lead to more situations like Encompass: situations where a well-intentioned application of a well-reasoned philosophy can render the statute the judge was trying to uphold
meaningless. It is yet to be seen how textualism will respond, or whether
it will or even can. If it cannot respond to the rapid pace of technological
change, perhaps some other jurisprudential philosophy will supplant it.
What that alternative may be, and whether such an alternative would be
advisable or referable cannot yet be determined. Only time will tell.
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